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Counterfactuals in quantum mechanics appear in discussions of a) non-
locality, b) pre- and post-selected systems, and c) interaction-free measure-
ments. Only the first two issues are related to counterfactuals as they are
considered in the general philosophical literature:
If it were that A, then it would be that B.
The truth value of a counterfactual is decided by the analysis of similarities
between the actual and possible counterfactual worlds [1].
The difference between a counterfactual (or counterfactual conditional)
and a simple conditional: If A, then B, is that in the actual world A is not
true and we need some “miracle” in the counterfactual world to make it true.
In the analysis of counterfactuals out of the scope of physics, this miracle is
crucial for deciding whether B is true. In physics, however, miracles are not
involved. Typically:
A : A measurement M is performed
B: The outcome of M has property P.
Physical theory does not deal with the questions of which measurement and
whether a particular measurement is performed? Physics yields conditionals:
“If Ai, then Bi”. The reason why in some cases these conditionals are con-
sidered to be counterfactual is that several conditionals with incompatible
premises Ai are considered with regard to a single system.
The most celebrated example is the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) ar-
gument in which incompatible measurements of the position or, instead, the
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momentum of a particle are considered. Stapp has applied a formal calculus
of counterfactuals to various EPR-type proofs [2, 3] and in spite of extensive
criticism [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], continues to claim that the nonlocality of quantum
mechanics can be proved without the assumption “reality” [10].
Let me give here just the main point of this controversy. Stapp provides
elaborate arguments in which an a priori uncertain outcome of a measure-
ment of O in one location might depend on the measurements performed on
an entangled quantum particle in another location. But if anything is differ-
ent in a counterfactual world, the outcome of the measurement of O need not
be the same as in the actual world. The core of the difficulty is this random-
ness of the outcomes of quantum measurements. The formal philosophical
analysis of counterfactuals which uses similarity criteria, presupposes that in
a counterfactual world which is identical to the actual world in all relevant
aspects up until the measurement of O, the outcome has to be the same.
Thus, Stapp’s analysis tacitly adopts the counterfactual definiteness [4, 5]
which is essentially equivalent to “reality” or hidden variables and which is
absent in the conventional quantum theory.
Important examples of quantum counterfactuals are elements of reality.
Consider the following definition [11]:
If we can infer with certainty that the result of measuring at
time t of an observable O is o, then, at time t, there exists an
element of reality O = o.
If we consider several elements of reality which cannot be verified together,
we obtain counterfactuals. A celebrated example is the Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) entangled state of three spin-1
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particles [12, 13]:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉A|↑〉B|↑〉C − |↓〉A|↓〉B|↓〉C). (1)
We consider spin component measurements of these three particles in the x
and y directions. The counterfactuals (the elements of reality) have a more
general form than merely “the value of O is o”, they are properties of a set
of three measurements:
{σAx}{σBx}{σCx} = −1,
{σAx}{σBy}{σCy} = 1, (2)
{σAy}{σBx}{σCy} = 1,
{σAy}{σBy}{σCx} = 1.
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Here {σAx} signifies the outcome of a measurement of σx of particle A etc.
Since one cannot measure for the same particle both σx and σy at the same
time, this is a set of counterfactuals. It is a very important set because no
local hidden variable theory can ensure such outcomes with certainty; there
is no solution for the set of equations (2).
Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals is asymmetric in time [14]. The coun-
terfactual worlds have to be identical to the actual world during the whole
time before A, but not after. This creates difficulty in applications of coun-
terfactuals to physics and especially to quantum mechanics because “before”
and “after” are not absolute concepts. Different Lorentz observers might
see different time ordering of measurements performed at different places.
Finkelstein [15] and Bigaj [16] have attempted to define time asymmetric
counterfactuals to overcome this difficulty. But in my view, the time asym-
metry of quantum counterfactuals is an unnecessary burden [17]. We can
consider a time symmetric (or time neutral) definition of quantum counter-
factuals.
The general strategy of counterfactual theory is to find counterfactual
worlds closest to the actual world. In the standard approach, the worlds
must be close only before the measurement. In the time-symmetric approach,
the counterfactual worlds should be close to the actual world both before
and after the measurement at time t. Quantum theory allows for a natural
and non-trivial definition of “close” worlds as follows: all outcomes of all
measurements performed before and after the measurement of O at time t
are the same in the actual and counterfactual worlds.
A peculiar example of time symmetric counterfactuals is the three box
paradox [18]. Consider a single particle prepared at time t1 in a superposition
of being in three separate boxes:
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉). (3)
At a later time t2 the particle is found in another superposition:
|Ψ2〉 = 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉 − |C〉). (4)
For this particle, a set of counterfactual statements, which are elements
of reality according to the above definition, is:
PA = 1,
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PB = 1. (5)
Or, in words: if we open box A, we find the particle there for sure; if we open
box B (instead), we also find the particle there for sure.
Beyond these counterfactual statements, there are numerous manifesta-
tions of the claim that in some sense, this single particle is indeed in two
boxes simultaneously. A single photon which interacts with this particle
scatters as if there are two particles: one in A and one in B, but two or more
photons do not “see” two particles. Many photons see this single particle as
two particles if the photons interact weakly with the particle. Indeed, there
is a useful theorem which says that if a strong measurement of an observable
O yields a particular outcome with probability 1, (i.e. there is an element of
reality) then a weak measurement yields the same outcome. Sometime this
is called a weak-measurement element of reality [19]. The outcomes of weak
measurements are weak values:
(PA)w = 1,
(PB)w = 1. (6)
Contrary to the set of counterfactuals above, the weak measurements can be
performed simultaneously both in box A and box B. Thus, the existence of
counterfactuals helps us to know the outcome of real (weak) measurement.
The three-box paradox and other time-symmetric quantum counterfactu-
als have raised a significant controversy [20, 21, 21, 22, 23, 11, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28]. It seems that the core of the controversy is that quantum counterfactuals
about the results of measurements of observables, and especially “elements
of reality” are understood as attributing values to observables which are not
observed. But this is completely foreign to quantum mechanics. Unper-
formed experiments have no results! “Element of reality” is just a shorthand
for describing a situation in which we know with certainty the outcome of a
measurement if it is to be performed, which in turn helps us to know how
weakly coupled particles are influenced by the system. Having “elements
of reality” does not mean having values for observables. The semantics are
misleading since “elements of reality” are not “real” in the ontological sense.
An attempt to give counterfactuals some ontological sense, at the cost of
placing artificial constraints on the context in which counterfactuals are con-
sidered, was made by Griffiths [29]. He showed that counterfactuals have no
paradoxical features when only consistent histories are considered. Another
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recent step in this direction are quantum counterfactuals in very restrictive
“measurement-ready” situations [30].
Penrose [31] used the term “counterfactuals” in a very different sense:
Counterfactuals are things that might have happened, although
they did not in fact happen.
In interaction-free measurements [32], an object is found because it might
have absorbed a photon, although actually it did not. This idea has been
applied to “counterfactual computation” [33], a setup in which the outcome
of a computation becomes known in spite of the fact that the computer did
not run the algorithm (in case of one particular outcome [34]).
In the framework of the Many-Worlds Interpretation, Penrose’s “counter-
factuals” are counterfactual only in one world. The physical Universe incor-
porates all worlds, and, in particular, the world in which Penrose’s “counter-
factual” is actual, the world in which the “counterfactual” computer actually
performed the computation.
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